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The typical identification strategy in aid effectiveness studies assumes donor motives do not 
influence the impact of aid on growth. We call this homogeneity assumption into question, 
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  Research on foreign aid identifies aid allocated both based on recipient need (RN) and 
donor interests (DI).  Following Boone (1995), most aid effectiveness studies capitalize on this 
by using political instruments to identify the impact of aid on growth (Burnside and Dollar 2000; 
Rajan and Subramanian 2008).
1  However, interpreting estimation results as the general impact 
of aid on growth requires the strong homogeneity assumption that donor motives do not 
influence aid effectiveness.  Only a handful of studies consider the impact of donor behavior on 
aid effectiveness in detail (Minoiu and Reddy 2007; Bearce and Tirone 2007; Headey 2008). 
  In this paper, we call this homogeneity assumption into question by developing an aid 
allocation model in which recipient government policy choices link donor motives to the impact 
of aid.  We test the assumption by including an estimate of need-based aid in a cross-country 
time-series growth regression.  The test rejects the homogeneity assumption, suggesting a more 
cautious interpretation of past research results. 
 
2. Model 
  Official development assistance is allocated by a donor and passes through the recipient 
government.  This means the objectives of both the donor and the recipient government – and 
how they interact – influence aid effectiveness.  If the donor is motivated by recipient need, its 
allocation decision depends on how the recipient uses aid.  This induces the recipient to select 
developmental policies.  If the donor is motivated by self-interest, its allocation decision does not 
depend on how the recipient uses aid and the recipient does not select developmental policies.   
 
2
Policy may be defined narrowly as the percentage of aid directed to investment or broadly as the 
overall quality of governance.  In either case, aid has more impact on growth when the donor’s 
motive is development.
2
  Aid allocation is a Stackelberg game in which the recipient government first picks policy 
quality (p0[0,1]) and then the donor picks the level of aid (D).
3  The recipient government has an 
ideal policy (p*) and views more aid as better.  The recipient selects actual policy p to maximize 
its objective function: 
D p p D p U + − − =
2 ) * ( ) , (  (1) 
The recipient will deviate from p* if it receives sufficient extra aid as compensation.  However, 
increasingly large amounts of aid are required for additional deviations from the ideal policy. 
  The donor selects its level of aid (D) to maximize its objective function which reflects 
both recipient need (RN) and donor self-interest (DI): 
] ) )( 1 ( ) ( [ ) , (
2 2 D D D pD p D V
DI RN − − + − − = α α  (2) 
where dD
RN/dRN>0, dD
DI/dDI>0 and "0[0,1].  Based solely on donor interests, the donor’s ideal 
level of aid is D
DI.  Likewise, the ideal level of aid based on recipient need is D
RN – if the 
recipient directs all aid to development purposes (p=1).  To the extent that aid is “wasted” (p<1), 
                                                                                                                                                             
1Jensen and Paldam (2006) and Doucouliagos and Paldam (2009) survey this literature 
and test for robustness. 
 
2We assume the donor can credibly threaten to withhold aid because it can redirect funds 
to other activities or because of reputation effects in a repeated game (no Samaritan's dilemma). 
 
3The donor may or may not announce conditions prior to the recipient picking policy.  
Assuming full information (the recipient knows donor preferences), the distinction between 
explicit conditionality (formal conditionality as in Structural Adjustment Programs) and implicit 
conditionality (e.g., selectivity) is irrelevant here.  
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the donor’s ideal level of need-based aid is correspondingly reduced to pD
RN.  Finally, the donor 
may place more emphasis on need (high ") or on geopolitical interests (low ").  The key feature 
of this model is that the donor only cares about how aid is used (policy) when the donor’s 
objective is humanitarian.  Geopolitically or commercially motivated aid is a bribe; how the 
recipient uses aid is irrelevant (Morgenthau 1962). 
  As Stackelberg follower, the donor’s reaction function is 
DI RN D pD p D ) 1 ( ) ( α α − + =  (3) 
Substituting (3) into (1) gives the reduced form recipient objective function: 
DI RN D pD p p p U ) 1 ( ) * ( ) (
2 α α − + + − − =  (4) 
After finding the FOC by setting the derivative of (4) with respect to p equal to zero, we can use 
the implicit function theorem to derive comparative statics for p: 
0 / , 0 / , 0 / > < > α d dp dD dp dD dp
DI RN  
Recipient policy will be better when the recipient is needier, worse when the recipient is more 
important to the donor, and better when the donor places more weight on need. 
  The final step in linking donor motives to aid effectiveness is to relate both donor aid and 
recipient policy to growth.  In a neoclassical growth model with technological change, 
) , ( L K AF Y =  (5) 
aid can influence output if it adds to capital stock (K) or improves efficiency (A).  Both of these 
effects are conditioned on recipient government policy.  Better policy indicates a greater share of 
aid is invested, e.g., )K=pD.  Likewise, a greater share of technical assistance aid will be used 
for its intended purpose in a good policy environment.  Formally, we can model total factor 
productivity as A=A(p,D) where dA/dp>0,  dA/dD>0 and d







DI.  Taken together, these indicate that need-aid has a 
greater impact on growth than geopolitically based aid.  In the linear growth equation 
X p D D g
RN DI
4 3 2 1 γ γ γ γ + + + =  (6) 
where X represents other variables that influence growth, this means that (2>(1.  Because it may 
be difficult to measure geopolitical interests consistently across donors and periods, we 
reformulate the equation (redefining coefficients appropriately) as: 
X p D D g
RN
4 3 2 1 γ γ γ γ + + + =  (7) 
Assuming D
DI≠0, the greater development effectiveness of D
RN implies (2>0.  Thus, in this 
model, the development effectiveness of aid depends on donor motives. 
 
3.  Homogeneity Hypothesis Test 
  The homogeneity assumption in the literature is equivalent to requiring (2=0 in (7).  To 
estimate (7), we construct a measure of need-based aid (D
RN) and aggregate across donors.   
Donors differ in their interests in a specific recipient (DI) and in the weight they place on RN 
versus DI across all recipients (").  To allow for this heterogeneity, we estimate donor-specific 
aid allocation equations of the form: 
ijt ijt i jt i ijt i jt i ijt Z p DI RN D ε β β β β + + + + = 4 3 2 1
~  (8) 
for aid from donor i to recipient j in year t.   p ~  is observed policy quality; Z are other factors that 
might influence aid allocation.
4  Our estimate of need-based aid is  ; aggregating  jt i
RN
ijt RN D 1 ˆ ˆ β =
                                                 
 
4If the policy impact of aid is narrow (e.g., p reflects the share of aid invested), then the 
impact of donor motives on aid effectiveness depends on aid not being completely fungible.  If 
the policy impact of aid is broad (e.g., donor motives for giving aid influence macroeconomic  
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jt RN D 1 ˆ ˆ β
RN
jt D ˆ jt since RNjt 
does not vary across donors.  This presents a collinearity problem if RNjt also enters the growth 
equation separately (e.g., initial GDP, population).  To avoid this, we allow donors to respond 
differently to need in their former colonies (a reasonable assumption given shared history, 
colonial guilt, and cultural affinity).  The result is a need variable that also varies across donors:  
ijt ijt i jt i ijt i ijt i ijt Z p DI RN D ε β β β β + + + + = 4 3 2 1
~  (9) 




jt RN D 1 ˆ ˆ β .  To test the assumption that 
the impact of aid is homogeneous, we estimate: 
jt jt jt
RN
jt jt jt X p D D g υ γ γ γ γ + + + + = 4 3 2 1
~ ˆ  (10) 
and test H0:  γ2=0 versus  H1:  γ2≠0. 
 
4. Data and Methods 
 To  construct  , our measure of need-based aid, we estimate (9) for the thirteen largest 
bilateral aid donors using annual data on aid flows to 117 countries for the period 1974-2001.  
The sample excludes observations with zero aid and high income OECD countries that receive 
aid plus Egypt and Israel.  The dependent variable is log gross disbursements.  The need 
variables are log population, log PPP per capita GDP, and their interactions with a dummy 
indicating if the recipient country is a former colony of that donor.  We include additional 
control variables, as listed in Table 1.  For data sources on these and other variables, see the on-
RN
jt D ˆ
                                                                                                                                                             
p
policy), then including the appropriate policy measure is sufficient to account for heterogeneity.  
However, the observed measure of policy quality ( ~ ) may be insufficient.  
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line data appendix.  Table 1 also summarizes the estimated coefficients on recipient need 
variables (employing OLS), all consistent with a need interpretation.  We use these to construct a 
need-aid variable.  For each donor-year, we multiply the ratio of predicted need-aid to predicted 
total aid by the actual aid amount, then sum across donors.
5
     [Table  1  about  here] 
  The growth regression is a panel analysis using four year period averages.  It covers 
1974-2001 and 62 developing countries.  The reduced country coverage is driven by data 
availability.
6  The dependent variable is the average four-year growth rate of per capita GDP.   
Estimation is with OLS; the specification is similar to Burnside and Dollar (2000) but includes 
country fixed effects.  Fixed effects have numerous advantages, e.g., eliminating concerns that 
non-geopolitical aid is biased toward countries with better (but unobserved) long run growth 
prospects.  In addition to aid to GDP ratios, the growth regression includes log of initial per 
capita GDP, number of assassinations, ethno-linguistic fractionalization interacted with 
assassinations, lagged M2 to GDP ratio (financial depth), Burnside-Dollar policy quality, and 
period dummies. 
 
5.  Results 
  Table 2 presents growth regression results.  Control variables enter in a similar fashion 
across all three columns.  Initial GDP enters with the expected negative sign; policy quality 
 
 
5The first step insures that need-aid is never more than actual aid. 
 
6The sample expands to 90 countries and 424 observations if we omit the ethno-linguistic 
fractionalization interaction term.  Results are the same as reported below.  
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enters positively.
7  The estimated coefficients for assassinations, assassinations times ethno-
linguistic fractionalization, and financial depth are all insignificant though with the expected sign 
or very small. 
     [Table  2  about  here] 
  In Column 1, Aid/GDP reflects the combined effects of need-aid and donor self-
interested aid.  The estimated coefficient is negatively and marginally significant.  Column 2 
adds a separate need-aid variable to test the homogeneity hypothesis.  Need-aid enters as 
significant with a positive coefficient indicating that the growth impact of need-aid is 
significantly different from the impact of aid when the donor has other objectives.  Column 3 
adds the aid/policy interaction at the core of Burnside and Dollar's analysis.  An F-test of the 




  Starting with a model of aid allocation, policy choice and growth, we illustrate how donor 
motives can influence the effectiveness of aid, undermining the homogeneity assumption implicit 
in the geopolitical instrumentation strategy used in many aid and growth regressions.  We also 
test and reject this assumption empirically.  This complicates interpretation of results in much of 




7This is an implicit dynamic panel specification.  Judson and Owen (1999) demonstrate 
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 Table  1 
 Aid  Allocation 
 
  Former  Colony   Former  Colony 
Donor Population  Population  GDP/capita  GDP/capita  N 
 
Canada 0.535**    -0.343**    2453 
Denmark 0.258**    -0.954**   1852 
France 0.245**  0.109**  -0.703**  0.404**  2523 
Germany 0.804**    -0.319**   2694 
Italy 0.395**    -0.469**    2290 
Japan 0.616**    -0.508**    2669 
Netherlands 0.740**  15.061  -0.613**  -7.525  2477 
Norway 0.482**   -0.853**    2022 
Spain 0.169**  0.0895  -0.508**  -0.825** 1215 
Sweden 0.174**   -0.600**    1831 
Switzerland 0.852**    -0.076    2339 
UK 0.734**  0.441**  -0.573**  -0.645  **  2471 




Estimation via OLS.  Dependent variable: log gross disbursements.  GDP per capita in PPP 
terms.  Estimations include:  number of deaths due to natural disasters, post-conflict dummy, 
Polity, Polity transition, Burnside-Dollar policy quality, UN vote alignment, UNSC "important 
year" membership dummy, oil reserves, former colony dummy, political alignment dummy, log 
exports to donor, log imports from donor, and year dummies.  
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 Table  2 
 Growth  Regressions 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
Initial  GDP  -6.996** -7.422** -7.568** 
Assassinations  -0.351 -0.377 -0.363 
  ×Fractionalization  0.001  0.002  0.002 
Financial  Depth  0.033 0.037 0.036 
BD Policy Index  0.001**  0.001**  0.001** 
Aid/GDP -10.709*  -48.221**  -54.937** 
  ×Policy Index      -0.005 
Need Aid/GDP    59.534**  65.250**  † 
  ×Policy Index      0.003  † 
 
Number of observations  362  362  362 
Number of countries  62  62  62 
 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05; robust standard errors 
†Jointly significant at 90% confidence level (p=0.0531). 
 
Includes country fixed effects and period dummies.   Appendix A:  Proof of Comparative Statics Results 
 
I.  Derivation of the Donor’s reaction function (Stackelberg follower): 
2 2 ) )( 1 ( ) ( ) , ( D D D pD p D V
DI RN − − − − − = α α  
FOC:   0 ) )( 1 ( 2 ) ( 2 | = − − + − = D D D pD
dD
dV DI RN
p α α  
0 ) )( 1 ( ) ( = − − + − D D D pD
DI RN α α  
DI RN D pD p D ) 1 ( ) ( α α − + =  
 
In the proofs below, we replace D
RN with RN and D
DI with DI to simplify the derivations.  Since 








, the signs in the proofs are unaffected.  
Finally, to keep the notation compact, we use x=RN and y=DI so that the donor reaction function 
can be written as  y px p D ) 1 ( ) ( α α − + = . 
 
II.  Proof that recipient government picks higher policy quality when donor places more 




2 / 1 2 2 / 1 2 ) ) 1 ( ( ) * ( )) ( ( ) * ( ) ( y px p p p D p p p U α α − + + − − = + − − =  
FOC:   0 ) ) 1 ( ( ½ ) * ( 2
2 / 1 = − + + − =
− y px x p p
dp
dU




  0 ) ) 1 ( )( ( ¼ ) ) 1 ( ( ½ 2
2 / 3 2 / 1 = − + − + − − + + −
− − y px y x
d
dp





α α α α
α
 
A1 0 ) ) 1 ( )( ( ) ) 1 ( ( 2 8
2 / 3 2 / 1 = − + − + − − + + −
− − y px y x
d
dp





α α α α
α
 
] ) ) 1 ( )( ( 2 [ ) ) 1 ( ( ] ) ) 1 ( ( 8 [
1 2 / 1 2 / 3 2 2 − − − − + − + − − + = − + + − y px y px y px x
d
dp
y px x α α α α α
α
α α α
] ) ) 1 ( )( ( 2 [ ) ) 1 ( ( ] ) ) 1 ( ( 8 [
1 2 / 1 2 / 3 2 2 − − − − + − − − + = − + + y px y px y px x
d
dp
y px x α α α α α
α
α α α
2 / 3 2 2
1 2 / 1
) ) 1 ( ( 8




− + − − − +
=
y px x




α α α α α
α
 
So  0 >
α d
dp
 if    ⇒   2 ) ) 1 ( )( (
1 < − + −
− y px y px α α α y px y px ) 1 ( 2 2 α α α α − + < −   ⇒   
y px ) 2 ( 0 α α − + <  
Since  1 ≤ α , all the terms in the sum are non-negative and at least some are positive so the 
inequality must hold.  Q.E.D. 
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A2 Multiply top and bottom by   
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Since  1 ≤ α ,  0 >
dx
dp
 and hence  0 >
dRN
dp
.  Q.E.D. 
 
IV.  Proof that recipient government picks lower policy quality when the recipient is more 
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Multiply top and bottom by   
2 / 3 ) ) 1 ( ( 4 y px α α − + −










=   
Since  1 ≤ α ,  0 <
dy
dp
 and hence  0 <
dDI
dp
.  Q.E.D. 
A3 B1 
  Appendix B: Sources and descriptive statistics 
 
  Table A1:  Descriptive Statistics for Allocation Regression Samples 
 
Canada (CAN)  Variable Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max   
2453 obs.  log aid  1.301082  2.086305  -4.60517  6.678455 
  log  population  16.02251 1.548047 12.41091 20.97667 
  log  GDP  7.858657 .8497038 6.178476 10.06949 
  #  killed  491.6494 7749.357 0  300000 
  postwar  .0729719 .2601434 0  1 
  polity  .1108846 6.990376 -10  10 
  polity  transition  .0008153 .0285481 0  1 
  BD  policy  .4476152 .4973496 0  1 
  oil  2.535856 14.25086 0  262.79 
  war  .0807175 .2724563 0  1 
  political  alignment  .2507134 .4335122 0  1 
  UNSC  42.98492 161.6141 0  1221 
  UN voting alignment  .6809555  .075955  .478022  1 
  lagged  log  exports  2.529024 1.855633 0  7.882639 
  lagged  log  imports  2.454358 2.095016 0  9.323768 
  lagged log all exports  7.294345  1.888589  0  12.5088 
  lagged log all imports  7.146961  2.002972  0  13.0876 
 
Denmark (DNK)  Variable Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max   
1852 obs.  log aid  .32215  2.234508  -4.60517  4.727919 
  log  population  16.29453 1.520804 12.75707 20.97667 
  log  GDP  7.760305 .8383322 6.178476 9.822355 
  #  killed  596.7754 8838.284 0  300000 
  postwar  .0826134 .2753713 0  1 
  polity  .0691145 6.935029 -10  10 
  BD  Policy  .4443844 .4970315 0  1 
 oil  2.07285  8.909292  0  133.25 
  war  .0863931 .2810195 0  1 
 political  alignment  .238121  .4260486  0  1 
  UNSC  49.65173 174.1504 0  1221 
  UN  voting  alignment  .7150559 .0630702 .4850746 1 
  lagged  log  exports  2.276804 1.475879 0  6.838583 
  lagged  log  imports  1.850429 1.718253 0  7.241251 
  lagged log all exports  7.315553  1.962218  0  12.5088 




France (FRA)  Variable Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max   
2523 obs.  log aid  2.1319  2.006536  -4.60517  7.989377 
  log  population  15.9837  1.562774 12.54516 20.97667 
  log  GDP  7.939671 .9093496 6.178476 10.67489 
  #  killed  466.8712 7626.934 0  300000 
  postwar  .0725327 .2594193 0  1 
 polity  -.1957987  7.082086  -10  10 
  polity  transition  .0007927 .0281495 0  1 
 BD  Policy  .43044  .4952359  0  1 
  former  colony  .2160127 .4116046 0  1 
  oil  5.967847 27.16804 0  262.79 
 war  .078478  .2689756  0  1 
  political  alignment  .2330559 .4228613 0  1 
  UNSC  42.49306 160.8641 0  1221 
  UN voting alignment  .6125272  .0821875  .423913  .875 
 lagged  log  exports  4.4751  1.789391  0  8.214294 
  lagged  log  imports  4.055673 1.998949 0  9.404278 
  lagged log all exports  7.397553  1.897197  0  12.5088 
  lagged log all imports  7.24885  2.051075  0  13.0876 
 
Germany (DEU)  Variable Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max   
2694 obs.  log aid  2.676073  1.939981  -4.60517  8.617753 
  log  population  15.91643 1.571445 12.30671 20.97667 
  log  GDP  7.953451 .9126224 6.178476 10.70551 
  #  killed  451.6451 7396.714 0  300000 
  postwar  .0727543 .2597809 0  1 
 polity  -.3151448  7.126762  -10  10 
  polity  transition  .0007424 .0272418 0  1 
 BD  policy  .452487  .4978298  0  1 
  oil  5.516594 26.20951 0  262.79 
  war  .0757238 .2646048 0  1 
 political  alignment  .218634  .4133964  0  1 
  UNSC  40.55382 155.6421 0  1221 
  UN  voting  alignment  .6594722 .0928383 .4610389 1 
 lagged  log  exports  4.453479  2.07305  0  9.628689 
  lagged  log  imports  4.290346 2.148347 0  9.903658 
  lagged log all exports  7.325551  1.909906  0  12.5088 





Italy (ITA)  Variable Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
2290 obs.  log aid  .5252859  2.511064  -4.60517  7.622449 
  log  population  16.15076 1.51179  12.57662 20.97667 
  log  GDP  7.867534 .8702322 6.178476 10.66554 
  #  killed  519.9624 8010.357 0  300000 
  postwar  .0799127 .2712172 0  1 
 polity  -.4768559  7.020138  -10  10 
  polity  transition  .0008734 .0295463 0  1 
  BD  policy  .4458515 .4971679 0  1 
 oil  4.21892  22.08949  0  262.697 
  war  .0873362 .2823888 0  1 
  political  alignment  .1213974 .3266598 0  1 
 UNSC  43.56026  162.239  0  1221 
  UN  voting  alignment  .6727527 .0786102 .4925373 1 
 lagged  log  exports  4.01306  1.910042  0  8.38558 
  lagged  log  imports  3.880841 2.118994 0  8.993204 
  lagged log all exports  7.389985  1.833021  0  12.5088 
  lagged log all imports  7.22928  1.989617  0  13.0876 
 
Japan (JPN)  Variable Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
2669 obs.  log aid  2.393954  2.551704  -4.60517  8.529519 
  log  population  15.92585 1.578514 12.30671 20.97667 
  log  GDP  7.966073 .9121624 6.178476 10.70551 
  #  killed  456.7359 7431.178 0  300000 
  postwar  .0734357 .2608993 0  1 
 polity  -.3274635  7.126502  -10  10 
 polity  transition  .0007493  .027369  0  1 
 BD  policy  .454852  .4980508  0  1 
 oil  5.653871  26.4538  0  262.79 
  war  .0730611 .2602855 0  1 
  political  alignment  .202323 .401807 0  1 
  UNSC  41.39116 157.9779 0  1221 
  UN  voting  alignment  .7165586 .0721542 .4873418 1 
  lagged  log  exports  4.291162 2.196871 0  10.5956 
  lagged  log  imports  3.785449 2.511866 0  11.03154 
  lagged log all exports  7.364601  1.885861  0  12.5088 




Netherlands (NLD)  Variable Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
2477 obs.  log aid  1.052159  2.063855  -4.60517  5.462263 
  log  population  16.00522 1.539068 12.30671 20.97667 
  log  GDP  7.85057  .8446514 6.178476 10.66794 
  #  killed  486.3133 7711.796 0  300000 
  postwar  .0767057 .2661776 0  1 
 polity  -.0617683  7.034864  -10  10 
  polity  transition  .0008074 .0284095 0  1 
  BD  Policy  .4557933 .4981425 0  1 
  oil  2.837206 15.27937 0  262.79 
  war  .0799354 .2712479 0  1 
  former  colony  .0117077 .1075886 0  1 
  political  alignment  .2309245 .4215093 0  1 
  UNSC  41.22164 158.7624 0  1221 
  UN  voting  alignment  .6741653 .0762057 .4925373 1 
  lagged  log  exports  3.327133 1.636923 0  7.890792 
  lagged  log  imports  3.165934 2.107587 0  9.312725 
  lagged log all exports  7.241348  1.89993  0  12.5088 
  lagged log all imports  7.092501  2.025192  0  13.0876 
 
Norway (NOR)  Variable Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
2022 obs.  log aid  .0876741  2.083411  -4.60517  5.732888 
  log  population  16.25663 1.498137 12.79603 20.97667 
  log  GDP  7.788535 .8359857 6.178476 10.25135 
  #  killed  580.9322 8513.503 0  300000 
 postwar  .086548  .2812411  0  1 
  polity  .5351137 6.873747 -10  10 
  polity  transition  .0009891 .0314425 0  1 
  BD  policy  .4431256 .4968777 0  1 
  oil  2.981306 15.17086 0  262.79 
  war  .0905045 .2869741 0  1 
  political  alignment  .2532146 .4349604 0  1 
 UNSC  47.4095  171.1679  0  1221 
  UN  voting  alignment  .7134267 .0672905 .4850746 1 
  lagged  log  exports  1.626101 1.409292 0  6.836946 
 lagged  log  imports  1.467134  1.63266  0  7.145362 
  lagged log all exports  7.350409  1.899115  0  12.5088 
  lagged log all imports  7.200393  2.038746  0  13.0876 B5 
 
 
Spain (ESP)  Variable Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
1215 obs.  log aid  .0206641  2.513487  -4.60517  6.298159 
  log  population  16.35992 1.470293 12.72165 20.97667 
  log  GDP  7.949864 .8855973 6.178476 9.991495 
  #  killed  351.7926 4321.416 0  139939 
 postwar  .090535  .2870648  0  1 
  polity  2.023045 6.402311 -10  10 
  polity  transition  .0016461 .0405553 0  1 
  BD  Policy  .3893004 .4877924 0  1 
  oil  3.603482 15.25888 0  260.05 
 war  .0806584  .272422  0  1 
 former  colony  .1053498  .30713  0  1 
  political  alignment  .2707819 .4445466 0  1 
  UNSC  57.02222 197.3644 0  1221 
  UN  voting  alignment  .7311244 .0751449 .4925373 .9180328 
  lagged  log  exports  3.542905 1.806017 0  7.689646 
  lagged  log  imports  3.752781 1.969969 0  8.410741 
  lagged log all exports  7.853031  1.834393  0  12.5088 
  lagged log all imports  7.654443  2.012284  0  13.0876 
 
Sweden (SWE)  Variable Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
1831 obs.  log aid  .6199201  2.103035  -4.60517  5.423848 
  log  population  16.29789 1.515847 13.0857  20.97667 
  log  GDP  7.862197 .8475577 6.178476 10.51645 
 #  killed  616.284  8927.352  0  300000 
  postwar  .0895685 .2856406 0  1 
  polity  1.170945 6.796716 -10  10 
  polity  transition  .0010923 .0330409 0  1 
  BD  policy  .4691425 .4991832 0  1 
  oil  3.313266 13.62592 0  168.848 
  war  .0944839 .2925806 0  1 
  political  alignment  .2878209 .4528709 0  1 
 UNSC  49.3905  177.6024  0  1221 
  UN  voting  alignment  .7485343 .0649892 .4925373 1 
 lagged  log  exports  2.791438  1.85543  0  7.563263 
  lagged  log  imports  2.069448 1.898665 0  7.467085 
  lagged log all exports  7.51789  1.954487  0  12.5088 




Switzerland (CHE)  Variable Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
2339 obs.  log aid  -.0615079  2.032892  -4.60517  3.908617 
  log  population  16.18486 1.483478 12.54516 20.97667 
  log  GDP  7.806329 .8310452 6.178476 10.06631 
  #  killed  523.4566 7941.931 0  300000 
 postwar  .084224  .2777829  0  1 
 polity  -.0119709  6.952105  -10  10 
  polity  transition  .0008551 .0292353 0  1 
  BD  policy  .4476272 .4973559 0  1 
  oil  2.849272 12.09847 0  133.25 
  war  .0876443 .2828374 0  1 
  political  alignment  .0085507 .0920933 0  1 
  UNSC  43.02309 162.3324 0  1221 
  lagged  log  exports  2.738114 1.774675 0  7.180854 
 lagged  log  imports  2.08266  1.690047  0  7.946908 
  lagged log all exports  7.335273  1.859602  0  12.5088 
  lagged log all imports  7.171286  2.012648  0  13.0876 
 
United Kingdom (GBR)  Variable Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
2471 obs.  log aid  .8514467  2.260599  -4.60517  5.849872 
  log  population  16.00948 1.546396 12.30671 20.97667 
  log  GDP  7.879746 .8659996 6.178476 10.70551 
  #  killed  489.8936 7722.021 0  300000 
  postwar  .0772966 .2671156 0  1 
 polity  .0408741  7.07756  -10  10 
 polity  transition  .0008094  .028444  0  1 
  BD  Policy  .4548766 .4980605 0  1 
  oil  2.294615 10.72941 0  133.25 
  war  .0772966 .2671156 0  1 
  former  colony  .2776204 .4479157 0  1 
  political  alignment  .2270336 .4189993 0  1 
  UNSC  42.54917 161.1211 0  1221 
  UN  voting  alignment  .5860477 .0929543 .3993506 1 
  lagged  log  exports  4.029561 1.780711 0  8.117226 
  lagged  log  imports  3.771724 2.034189 0  9.26052 
  lagged log all exports  7.3059  1.886482  0  12.5088 






United States (USA)  Variable Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
2399 obs.  log aid  3.046075  1.753187  -4.60517  8.959183 
  log  population  16.01915 1.535003 12.47972 20.97667 
  log  GDP  7.853908 .8469107 6.178476 10.02417 
  #  killed  483.0842 7793.561 0  300000 
  postwar  .0766986 .2661681 0  1 
 polity  -.0050021  7.052287  -10  10 
  polity  transition  .0008337 .0288675 0  1 
  BD  policy  .4476865 .4973594 0  1 
  oil  1.972584 10.73022 0  262.73 
  war  .0779491 .2681474 0  1 
  former  colony  .0116715 .1074249 0  1 
  political  alignment  .2313464 .4217812 0  1 
  UNSC  42.06461 160.5664 0  1221 
  UN  voting  alignment  .3615605 .1172837 .1689189 .7363636 
  lagged  log  exports  4.814886 2.196771 0  11.59683 
  lagged  log  imports  4.758642 2.553019 0  11.82148 
  lagged log all exports  7.248561  1.872991  0  12.5088 
  lagged log all imports  7.088391  1.983854  0  13.0876 B8 
  Table A2:  Allocation Regressions by Donor 
  For donors with former colonies 
 
  ESP  FRA GBR NLD USA 
log  population  0.169*  0.245*** 0.734*** 0.740*** 0.407*** 
  (2.15) (8.80) (18.15)  (20.03)  (12.18) 
  H colony dummy  -0.0895  -0.109* -0.441***  15.06  -2.728 
  (-0.44) (-2.09) (-9.30) (0.71)  (-0.81) 
log  GDP  -0.508*** -0.703*** -0.573*** -0.613*** -0.304*** 
  (-3.68) (-14.35)  (-7.88) (-9.79) (-5.13) 
  H colony dummy  -0.825*  0.404***  -0.645***  -7.525  -2.893 
  (-2.14) (4.01)  (-6.96) (-0.98) (-0.48) 
#  killed  -0.00000453 -0.00000176 0.00000410  -0.00000255 -0.00000415 
  (-0.33) (-0.57) (0.96)  (-0.63) (-1.16) 
  H colony dummy  -0.000555  -0.0000757  0.00000506  -0.000553  0.0000347 
  (-0.52) (-0.28) (0.47)  (-0.95) (0.21) 
postwar  0.831*** -0.227*  0.143  0.543*** 0.373*** 
  (3.80) (-2.25)  (1.07) (4.39) (3.36) 
  H  colony  dummy  -1.199 -0.258 0.0289 -0.664 -0.629 
  (-1.41) (-0.94) (0.11)  (-0.88) (-1.03) 
polity  0.0201  0.0335*** 0.0599*** 0.0501*** 0.00752 
  (1.76) (7.46) (9.36) (9.09) (1.53) 
  H colony dummy  0.0399  -0.00587  -0.0323**  0.0350  0.0516 
  (0.79)  (-0.48) (-3.04) (0.31)  (0.57) 
polity  transition  -0.862  1.840 1.059 0.0816  1.207 
  (-0.60)  (1.57) (1.00) (0.07) (1.26) 
  H  colony  dummy   2.641     
   ( 1 . 5 8 )      
BD  policy  0.118  0.0398 -0.0620  0.159* 0.440*** 
  (0.87) (0.73) (-0.81)  (2.39) (7.50) 
  H colony dummy  1.069*  -0.348*  0.0519  -1.972  -0.442 
  (2.56) (-2.50)  (0.35) (-1.11)  (-0.41) 
colony  dummy  9.833*** -0.157  14.17*** -226.1  73.51 
  (3.31)  (-0.13) (11.81) (-0.65) (1.26) 
oil  -0.0268*** -0.00614***  -0.0174*** -0.00722***  -0.0140*** 
  (-6.41) (-6.20) (-5.61) (-3.33) (-5.11) 
war  -0.0678 -0.244**  -0.0125 0.397***  0.0920 
  (-0.30) (-2.69) (-0.10) (3.32)  (0.85) 
political  alignment  0.376**  0.0143 0.0224 0.155* -0.0956 
  (2.80) (0.25) (0.29) (2.01) (-1.41) 
UNSC  0.0000522 0.000101  0.0000708 0.000167  -0.0000240 
  (0.17) (0.67) (0.36) (0.83) (-0.13) 
UN voting alignment  -6.705***  -0.526  2.671***  1.499*  -0.550 
  (-6.71) (-1.05) (4.39)  (2.40)  (-1.30) 
lagged log exports  1.015***  0.888***  0.0577  0.0381  0.482*** 
  (13.40) (27.50) (1.16)  (0.86)  (14.66) 
lagged log imports  0.0474  0.0789**  0.217***  0.0737*  -0.0105 
  (0.67) (2.65) (6.09) (2.33) (-0.39) 
lagged log all exports  -0.250  -0.289***  -0.0947  0.138*  0.121* 
  (-1.94) (-5.97) (-1.47) (2.25)  (2.10) 
lagged log all imports  -0.0861  -0.0876 -0.0258 -0.358***  -0.395*** 
  (-0.67) (-1.83) (-0.44) (-6.15) (-6.71) 
 
N  1215 2523 2471 2477 2399 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
Estimation via OLS B9 
  Table A2:  Allocation Regressions by Donor 
  For donors with no former colonies 
 
  CAN  CHE  DEU  DNK  ITA JPN NOR  SWE 
log  population  0.534*** 0.852*** 0.804*** 0.258*** 0.395*** 0.616*** 0.482***  0.174** 
  (13.64) (18.47) (28.22) (4.36)  (7.75)  (17.53) (10.00)  (3.01) 
log  GDP  -0.343*** -0.0764  -0.319*** -0.954*** -0.469*** -0.508*** -0.853***  -0.600*** 
  (-5.11) (-1.02) (-6.68) (-10.50)  (-5.50) (-8.34) (-10.53)  (-6.13) 
#  killed  0.000000260  0.00000199 -0.00000587  0.00000601 0.00000128 -0.00000457  0.00000115  0.00000309 
  (0.07) (0.48) (-1.84)  (1.18) (0.25) (-1.09)  (0.25)  (0.61) 
postwar  -0.247* 0.195  -0.200* -0.122  0.377*  -0.647***  0.577***  0.590*** 
  (-2.01) (1.63)  (-2.13) (-0.71) (2.36)  (-5.26) (4.00)  (3.58) 
polity  -0.0111*  0.0132* 0.0279***  0.0172* 0.00335 0.0218***  0.0501***  0.0219** 
  (-2.02)  (2.35) (6.83) (2.12) (0.44) (4.11) (7.05)  (2.69) 
polity  transition  2.032 0.641 1.856*    3.344*  -2.302*  -1.400  1.577 
  (1.89) (0.57) (2.16)   (2.38) (-2.05)  (-1.13)  (1.16) 
BD  policy  -0.124 -0.221**  0.130**  0.146  0.173* 0.0117 0.163*  0.133 
  (-1.90)  (-3.19)  (2.63) (1.49) (1.97) (0.18) (1.96)  (1.37) 
oil  -0.0178*** -0.0281*** -0.00871***  -0.0278*** -0.0161*** -0.00955***  -0.00909**  -0.00946** 
  (-7.82) (-9.78) (-8.71) (-5.00) (-7.89) (-7.28) (-3.28)  (-2.62) 
war  -0.130  0.361**  -0.519*** -0.339*  0.633***  -1.064*** 0.885***  0.549*** 
  (-1.10) (3.03)  (-5.60) (-2.05) (4.12)  (-8.54) (6.25)  (3.38) 
political  alignment  0.0227 -0.899*  0.124* -0.0234  0.0132 0.0261 0.206*  0.495*** 
  (0.31) (-2.46)  (2.10) (-0.22)  (0.10) (0.32) (2.24)  (4.88) 
UNSC  0.000205 0.0000393  0.000132 -0.000482  0.000507 -0.000234  0.000310  0.000210 
  (1.04) (0.19) (0.85) (-1.80)  (1.92) (-1.16)  (1.31)  (0.80) 
UN voting alignment  4.044***    1.250**  1.312  -0.888  0.429  1.572*  -0.812 
  (6.31)   (2.60) (1.39) (-1.04)  (0.63) (2.03)  (-0.89) 
lagged  log  exports  0.705*** -0.0257  0.304*** 0.915*** 0.664*** 0.495*** 0.266***  0.664*** 
  (16.99) (-0.47) (8.59)  (12.89) (11.79) (14.02) (5.16)  (11.20) 
lagged log imports  -0.0458  -0.0202  0.0917***  0.000739  0.0212  0.135***  0.0284  -0.0363 
  (-1.51)  (-0.51)  (3.48) (0.01) (0.44) (5.16) (0.67)  (-0.76) 
lagged log all exports  -0.387***  0.453***  -0.204*** -0.352*** -0.432*** -0.0273  -0.173* -0.264** 
  (-6.70) (6.62)  (-4.28) (-4.13) (-4.87) (-0.44) (-2.38)  (-3.13) 
lagged log all imports  0.107  -0.715***  -0.138**  -0.0573 0.0465  -0.0896 -0.115  -0.167* 
  (1.93)  (-11.91)  (-3.16) (-0.75) (0.58)  (-1.57) (-1.68)  (-2.07) 
 
N  2453 2339 2694 1852 2290 2669 2022  1831 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 








  Table A3:  Descriptive Statistics for Growth Regression Sample 
  (362 observations; 62 countries) 
 
Variable Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
GDP  growth  1.092133 3.415615 -12.96011  17.05426 
Initial  GDP  6.800601 1.06149  4.657915 8.987198 
Assassinations .4854972  1.25047  0  11.5 
  H  Fractionalization  17.60704 58.09222 0  736 
Financial  Depth  28.04208 16.32562 6.085686 120.8928 
BD Policy Index  -128.1457  682.4691  -8750.868  5.870643 
Aid/GDP  .0380722 .0421961 .000000153  .3310182 
  H  Policy  Index  -7.398583 69.71358  -1214.182 .3758931 
Need  Aid/GDP  .0224103 .0257368 .000000153  .2100129 





























  Table A4:  Variable Definitions and Sources 
 
 Allocation  Equations 
Variable Definition  Source       
log aid  Log of total official gross bilateral disbursements  OECD DAC (2006) 
in millions of 2006 dollars 
log population  Log of population  World Bank (2008) 
log GDP  Log of GDP per capita in PPP terms  World Bank (2008) 
# killed  Number of people killed by natural disasters  EM-DAT (2007) 
postwar  0/1 indicator for 5 year period following "war"  Gleditsch et al. (2002) 
polity  -10 to 10 autocracy to democracy polity2 index  Marshall and Jaggers (2008) 
polity transition  0/1 indicator for polity2=-88 (transition)  Polity IV Project (2005) 
BD policy  Burnside-Dollar policy quality index  Burnside and Dollar (2000) 
oil  Proven oil reserves, billion barrels  British Petroleum (2007) 
war  0/1 indicator of war with at least 1000 conflict deaths Gleditsch  et al. (2002) 
former colony  0/1 former colony indicator (recipient/donor pairing)  Correlates of War (2003) 
political alignment  0/1 indicator of executive political alignment between  Beck et al. (2001) 
donor and recipient (LL, RR, etc.) 
UNSC  0/1 indicator of UNSC membership in important year  Kuziemko and Werker (2006) 
UN voting alignment  UN voting alignment between donor and recipient  Voeten and Merdzanovic (2008) 
lagged log exports  log of exports from donor to recipient, lagged 1 year  IMF (2006A, 2006B) 
lagged log imports  log of imports from donor to recipient, lagged 1 year  IMF (2006A, 2006B) 
lagged log all exports  log of exports from world to recipient, lagged 1 year  IMF (2006A, 2006B)  
lagged log all imports  log of imports from world to recipient, lagged 1 year  IMF (2006A, 2006B) 
 
 
 Growth  Equations 
Variable Definition  Source       
GDP growth  Growth rate of GDP per capita  World Bank (2008) 
Initial GDP  GDP per capita in PPP terms at start of 4 year period  World Bank (2008) 
Assassinations  Number of assassinations  Banks (2002) 
Fractionalization Ethno-linguistic fractionalization   Easterly and Levine (1997) 
Financial Depth  M2 / GDP lagged one 4 year period  World Bank (2008) 
BD Policy Index  Burnside-Dollar policy quality index  Burnside and Dollar (2000) 
Aid/GDP  Total official gross bilateral disbursements / GDP  OECD DAC (2006), World Bank (2008) 
Need Aid/GDP  Estimated need-based aid / GDP  Authors' calculations  Appendix  References 
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